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664 Northcliffe Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
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PlaintiS/Appellant respectfully asks the Court to rehear this case on the basis 
of the following misapprehensions of points of fact and law. 
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POINTS OF FACT 
1. As a matter of fact, W. Brent Jensen was never the president of 
Security Title Company. 
The Court's critical misapprehension of fact is thinking that W. Brent Jensen 
was the president of Security Title as well as the president of Deseret Diversified 
and Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc. [2005 UT App. 294, para. 3 note 2, and para. 30]. 
Because of this error, the Court sees the situation as one where W. Brent Jensen 
was "cavalier in his documentation," [2005 UT App. 294, para. 29] when, in fact, 
his documentation was entirely correct in drawing a sharp distinction between 
Security Title (for whom he had no authority to act) and Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc. 
(of which he was the president). 
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The Court's misapprehension of fact may have been caused by the Plat for 
Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D (the plat involved in the companion case) having been 
signed for Deseret Diversified by W. Brent Jensen as its president and by Security 
Title by I,eo D. Jensen as its vice president, but, m an* case, the piat loi 1'nie 
Meadow Kancn ru , ., ./as signer D, ^ecuiuy mie . j.)iaon : i » MCR" 
described .is ih "exmilivr v'uv president." 
2 As a matter of fact, Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc. never took title to 
Peters' lot or to the lots in Pine Meadow Ranch Plat D generally. 
A second misapprehension of fact is the Court's apparently thinking that Pine 
Meadow Ranch, Inc. took title to Petitioner's lot when it writes "Petitioner 
[Plaintiff] is a successor to ine estate oi uie unginai covenanting parties, [zvv: \ ; 
J tpp
 k
 I L J" ' i p . l l 11 1 1 II Il .ill II II 111 uu ;S'. 
covenanting part -e M^Hrm Rani >eran<;e Pine Meadow R anch Iiic 
had no estate. It never took title to the lot. 
3. As a matter of fact, Pine Meadow Ranch Plat D does not identify 
Respondent as owner and subdivider and Plat D identifies Security Title as an 
owner. 
^ ly^j misapprehend;. is confusing ''Respond' 
t I 1 Ill II II II II II I II II i l l . I l l I J c l l ' i l n l f l i l l I ' l l l l H H i I I I i1 I 1 II III I III I ill I I II II IK ' \ i i i i l ' K l l l O l l l l V U l l l i l l I ' l l h 
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Meadow Ranch, Inc.. The Court says "Respondent and Security, acting together, 
filed [Plat D]. This is not true. Plat D was signed by Pine Meadow Ranch, [Inc.] 
and by Security Title, but not by "Respondent." The plat identifies both Pine 
Meadow Ranch, Inc. And Security Title as "owners" but does not specify what they 
own, except for the streets which are to remain the property of Pine Meadow 
Ranch, [Inc.]. It is not true that Respondent recorded the 1973 CC&R's. They 
were recorded by W. Brent Jensen and subsequently adopted by Pine Meadow 
Ranch, Inc.. 
A critical point the Court misapprehends is that the Pit does not "identify" 
Security Title as a "trustee." It merely uses "trustee" after the name. To treat this 
as extrinsic evidence of the actual existence of a trust is circular when the issue is 
whether the doctrine of descriptio personae applies. The point of the doctrine is 
that the use of the word "trustee" in connection with the name may be merely 
descriptive. To be "extrinsic evidence" of a trust, the evidence must not be the use 
of the word as part of the name. 
Even if these facts were corrected, the Court seems to be under some 
misapprehension as to the issue. The issue is whether the facts of the case prove as 
a matter of law that trust existed in 1965 at the time of the Bates deed. Since the 
corrected facts are consistent with (1) there being no actual trust, (2) there being a 
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trust for the benefit of someone other than Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc. (which could 
not have been the beneficiary since it was formed until 1973), it follows that even if 
the facts overcome the presumption of the descriptio personae doctrine, they do not 
prove there was a trust in 1965 or that Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc., was the 
beneficiary of that trust in 1973. 
One critical fact that the Court overlooks is that in the 1973 CC&R's Pine 
Meadow Ranch, Inc., did not assert it owned the land covered by them or that it was 
the beneficiary of a trustee who owned the land. What it actually said was that it "is 
the owner of or intends to acquire" that land. 
Although the authenticity of the documents is not disputed in this case, the 
factual conclusions to be drawn from those documents is disputed. Plaintiff argues 
that they do not prove as a matter of law there was a trust in 1965 or in 1973. 
Defendant argues they do. In the last analysis, unless the Court is prepared to agree 
with Defendant, the Court is required by precedent to construe the facts in favor of 
Plaintiff as the losing side, Black v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2004 UT 66, para. 9, 100 P.3d 
1163, 1166. The issue is not whether the preponderance of the evidence is whether 
there really was a trust or whether there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of 
fact. In effect, the issue is whether a reasonable person could conclude there 
actually was no trust established in 1965 or that there was, but in 1973 Pine 
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Meadow Ranch, Inc., was not its beneficiary. 
POINTS OF LAW 
4. The Court's misapprehension that W. Brent Jensen was the president 
of Security Title leads it to misapprehend the application of the doctrine of 
descriptio personae because it leaves no explanation for the seven plus year 
gap between the 1965 Bates Deed and the 1973 CC&R's. 
One of the points Plaintiff stressed both in its brief and in oral argument is 
that the Bates Deed was given in 1965 and that, therefore, to defeat the doctrine of 
descriptio personae Defendant must prove that a trust existed in 1965. 
If W. Brent Jensen had been the president of Security Title, then the Court 
might be justified in thinking that he was simply being cavaher in his documentation 
and that there was a definite beneficiary in 1965, perhaps W. Brent Jensen himself 
or some entity controlled by him, whose beneficial interest was transferred to 
Deseret Diversified after its formation in 1971. But, the fact is that W. Brent Jensen 
played no role in Security Title. Therefore, the only evidence of the existence of a 
trust in 1965 is the use of the word "trustee" on the Bates Deed. And, the only 
evidence of the existence of a trust in 1973 is: 
(1) The "fact" that Security Title is a title company "that often holds title to 
property as trustee," for which proposition the Court cites two cases where title 
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companies took title to property as a trustee under deeds of trust [2005 UT App 
294, para. 29]. Appellant is distressed by this because in its briefs it carefully 
pointed out the critical distinction between a title company taking title under a deed 
of trust as security for a loan (which all title companies do as a routine part of their 
regular business), and taking title as trustee under a quit claim or warranty deed 
where the grantee is to manage the property itself (something which a title company 
cannot lawfully do). Thus, the fact that Security Title was a title company actually 
tends to show it there was no trust because acting as a traditional trustee (who 
manages the property) would have been unlawful and corporations are, generally, 
careful to stay within their powers. 
(2) The repeated use of the word "trustee" as part of the name of Security 
Title. But, of course, this is precisely what the doctrine of description personae 
says does not prove the actual existence of a trust and is not extrinsic evidence. 
5. The Utah Statute of Frauds prevents ratification of a deed by 
implication. 
Influenced, perhaps, by the misapprehension that W. Brent Jensen was the 
president of Security Title and was signing documents on its behalf, the Court holds 
that the signing and recordation of the plat for Pine Meadow Ranch Plat D by 
Security Title "ratified" the 1973 CC&R's which had previously been recorded by 
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W. Brent Jensen and adopted by Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc. [2005 UT App 295, 
para. 6] 
One of the problems solved by the Utah Statute of Frauds is the problem of 
agents. Suppose a deed is signed by a person purporting to be an agent of the 
owner. The deed would be "signed" as required by the statute, and the claimant 
would argue that the contract of agency could be valid even if oral because it was 
not a contract for the sale of real property. 
To block this argument, the Utah Statute of Frauds expressly provides that the 
document must be signed by the owner or "or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized in writing." In short, authority cannot be oral or implied, it must be 
expressly granted in writing. 
Ratification is one way to grant authority to an agent. It is "after the fact," 
but that makes no difference under the statute. The statute does not allow implied 
authorization before or after the fact. It would make the statute a hollow shell if the 
purported agent could simply smile and say, "well, after I signed for the owner, the 
owner ratified it by this or that action, even though I was never given authority in 
writing." 
It follows that the recordation of the plat did not ratify the prior CC&R's 
because the plat does not give any authority to Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc. to act for 
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Security Title by signing the 1973 CC&R's. 
6. The Court misapprehends the law of trusts in thinking that 
beneficiaries have the power to encumber specific trust property and 
misapprehends the holding of Capital Assets Financial Services v. Maxwell in 
saying that it holds a trust beneficiary has such a power. 
It is true that Plaintiff argues that a trust beneficiary cannot encumber specific 
property held in trust and that Plaintiff did not cite any authority so holding. But, 
the reason for there being no authority, Plaintiff respectfully submits, is that such a 
power is so radically out of line with the general law of trusts that no lawyer would 
have the gall to litigate the issue. 
If the Court changes the law, it will be a radical change in Utah trust law. 
There may be thousands of Utah trusts that were established on the assumption that 
putting property in the hands of the trustee meant that the beneficiary could not sell, 
encumber, or otherwise deal with the property. Under this Court's holding, the 
purpose of those trusts would be defeated. The beneficiary would be able to 
encumber the property and leave the trustee holding an empty bag. 
The decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Capital Assets Financial Services 
v. Maxwell does not hold a trust beneficiary has a power to encumber. 
In the Capital Assets case, Christensen had a judgment entered against him in 
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favor of Lindsay. Christensen needed money, so he asked his friend Peterson if 
Peterson could put up some real estate as collateral for a loan. Peterson's daughter, 
Lott, did so by quitclaiming the property to Christensen who used it to obtain a loan 
from Capital Assets, Christensen giving Capital Assets a first deed of trust on the 
property. Christensen then conveyed the property back to Lott subject to the deed 
of trust. 
The issue in the case was whether Lindsay's judgment hen attached to the 
property at the moment when Lott conveyed it to Christensen by quitclaim deed. 
Capital Assets argued the hen did not because Christensen took the property as a 
trustee, having no beneficial interest in it. Capital Assets argued that the property 
was beneficially owned by it (to the extent of its security interest) and by Lott (as to 
her residual interest) and that it was never intended that Christensen would have any 
beneficial interest in it. What he owned beneficially was the money he borrowed, 
not the real property. In short, the transaction should be viewed as if Lott had 
simply executed the deed of trust herself giving Capital Assets security for the loan 
to Christensen. 
Now, who is the trustee of this supposed trust? It is Christensen. He took 
title. Who are the beneficiaries? They are Lott and Capital Assets. They claimed 
beneficial ownership but did not, at the moment Lott gave Christensen the quit claim 
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deed, have title. 
The Supreme Court held on these facts that the judgment lien attached - that 
Christensen had, at the moment he received the quit claim deed from Lott, an 
interest in the property to which the judgment lien attached in spite of his preexisting 
agreement with Lott, and that disposed of the case. 
Does this case deal with the power of a trust beneficiary to encumber trust 
res? It does not. The putative trust beneficiaries, Lott and Capital Assets, did not 
purport to encumber the property. 
The issue in the case was whether the judgment hen attached at the moment 
Christensen received the quit claim deed from Lott. The holding cannot go beyond 
the issue. 
If this Court holds that trust beneficiaries have power to encumber trust res, it 
will be a radical departure from the American law of trusts. Utah will be the only 
American jurisdiction that so holds. It is precisely in these circumstances, where 
this Court is about to make a radical departure from prior law, that rehearing should 
be granted so that the issue may be addressed in full. 
Dated: Respectfully submitted: 
/s/ Boyd Kimball Dyer 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT 
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CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FMTH 
I certify that I am presenting this petition for rehearing in good faith because I 
beheve the Court has misapprehended critical points of fact and law and not for 
delay. 
Date: 
/s/ Boyd Kimball Dyer 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the following date I served two copies of the forgoing Petition 
for Rehearing by depositing the same in the U.S. Postal Service, first class postage 
prepaid, addressed to the following person: 
Mr. Edwin C. Barnes, Esq. 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 - 2216 
Dated: 
/s/ Boyd Kimball Dyer 
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